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ABSTRACT

Corporate Governance is one of the most important aspects of corporate
life. The role requires individuals to have a moderate, if not excellent command of
not only the industry they are operating within, but the basic tenants of many
disciplines including law and finance. It is therefore important to not only view
how these disciplines contribute to their knowledge individually, but also how they
might work together to provide a better insight into governing a company on a
day-to-day basis.
A predominant decision that often comes under scrutiny is the relationship
between executive compensation and M&A Activity. This paper takes a multidisciplinary approach to corporate governance by looking at the legal and financial
motivations and obligations of directors and officers as they pertain to M&A
activity, in order to gain insight into the legal and behavioural theories that drive
their actions.
The paper will summarize studies outlining the paradoxical interests of
directors and officers as representatives of the corporation and shareholders, in the
context of M&A activity. This study will combine those insights with the legal
landscape, in order to make recommendations with respect to best practices of
directors and officers and contribute to the foundational knowledge on Corporate
Governance.
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NOMENCLATURE

“Acquisition” – An acquisition is a corporate action in which a company buys
most, if not all, of another firm’s ownership stakes to assume control of it. An
acquisition occurs when a buying company obtains more than 50% ownership in a
target company. As part of the exchange, the acquiring company often purchases
the target company’s stock and other assets, which allows the acquiring company
to make decisions regarding the newly acquired assets without the approval of the
target company’s shareholders. Acquisitions can be paid for using cash. In the
acquiring company’s stock or a combination of both.

“Agency Theory” – Agency theory explains the relationship between principals
and agents in business. Agency theory is concerned with resolving problems that
can exist in agency relationships due to unaligned goals or different levels of risk
aversion.

“CEO Duality” – The notion that a CEO will hold more than one position, and
therefore have to act in more than one capacity in the organization. For example,
when the CEO is also the Chair of the Board of directors.

“Compensation Mix” – Compensation Mix describes the different components of
compensation and how they form into one structure to compensate employees. The
viii

most common types of compensation that make up this mix is base pay and
incentive pay, such as Employment Stock Option plans.

“Directors & Officers” – Directors are responsible for supervising the activities of
the corporation and for making decisions regarding those activities. Officers are
responsible for the day-to-day operation of the corporation, which includes
positions such as CEO and other C-Suite positions within a company.

“Earnings-Management” – Earnings Management is the use of accounting
techniques to produce financial reports that present an overly positive view of a
company’s business activities and financial position.

“Equity Based Compensation” (“EBC”) – EBC is a non-cash pay that represents
ownership in a company. This type of compensation can take many forms,
including options, restricted stock and performance shares. ECB allows the
employee of the company to share in the profits via appreciation and can
encourage retention.

“Employee Stock Option” (“ESO”) – An ESO is a stock option granted to
specified employees of a company. ESO’s offer the option holder the right, but not
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the obligation, to buy a certain amount of company shares at a predetermined price
for a specific period of time.

“Fiduciary Duty” – A legal term describing the relationship between two parties
that obligates one to act solely in the interest of the other. The party designated as
the fiduciary owes the legal duty to a principal, and strict care is taken to ensure no
conflict of interest arises between the fiduciary and his principal. Any individual
person, corporation, partnership or government agency can act as a principal or
agent as long as the person or business has the legal capacity to do so.

“Non-Equity Compensation” – Compensation that does not come in the form of an
ownership stake in a particular company. Typically Non-Equity Compensation is
referred to cash compensation and can often be triggered by successfully closing
an M&A transaction.

“Pay for Performance (Merit Pay)” – An approach to compensation that rewards
the higher performing employees with additional pay or incentive pay.
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CHAPTER 1
MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO LAW AND FINANCE
Introduction
Corporate Governance is a very loaded term. Broadly defined, it is a “system of
rules, practices and processes by which a company is directed and controlled. It involves
balancing the interests of a company’s many stakeholders, such as shareholders,
management, customers, suppliers, financiers, government and the community”
(Investopedia, 2018). It includes more and more as the gamut of executive
responsibilities widens to incorporate more legal and managerial obligations. Further,
what they may be legally obliged to do may not include some of the above stakeholders
in question. What they must do in actuality, in order to be successful, is in fact far more
complex because there is a component of self-interest in their roles.
The real essence of proper corporate governance is the notion that the decisions
one makes as a director or officer should be done in a conscientious way so as to not
welcome liability, and create a sound process for how the corporation should run. This
includes, as we will see later on, the notions of fiduciary obligations and a duty of care.
This topic stemmed from those issues that merge multiple stakeholders in a multidisciplinary lens adding to the already critical lens of executive action. It seeks to ask the
question; how do all the obligations interact and what issues arise as a result?
One such topic is the role of directors to set out a compensation scheme that best
motivates executive officers to engage in behaviors that most benefit the corporate entity,
the more popular of those behaviors being merger and acquisition activity. With
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historical issues of conflicting objectives between the officers and their shareholders
being as ever present as always, this paper sought to examine the relationship between
executive compensation and M&A activity, in order to learn more about the literary
landscape and combine it with current legal obligations of these officers.
The role of compensation in M&A activity began raising certain enquiries such
as; is there a premium on compensation for executives in consolidation deals, does the
expediency of a deal justify a premium on compensation rather than through natural
internal growth, should this discourage shareholders, and ultimately does it even matter
for their long term return?
This paper will act as a meta-analysis that seeks to explore and discuss the
relationship between executive compensation and company driven acquisitions with
respect to shareholder return, calling into question whether the officers and directors of a
company are pulling their weight to bring value to shareholders, as opposed to simply
driving/executing on their compensation structures.
The paper is organized into seven sections. The first section will explain the
reason for the paper, provide the research question and discuss the relevance of the topic.
The second section will discuss the methodology used in obtaining information and
findings for the paper. The third section will provide the literature review that comprises
the content for the main meta-analysis of the discussion section. This includes covering
research on the topics of; (a) Mergers and Acquisitions, (b) Regulatory and Legal
Landscape of Directors & Officers and their obligations to the corporation they serve, (c)
the Socio-Psychological frameworks that drive agency issues, and (d) the effects of
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executive compensation on M&A activity. The fourth section will summarize the
findings of the literature review and offer several themes prevalent in the research. The
fifth section will provide a brief conclusion to the findings. The sixth section will briefly
discuss limitations of the research and provide suggestions for areas of future research.

Research Question
The research question in brief is as follows: What factors are significant with
respect to the relationship between compensation and M&A activity? This paper intends
to unravel what compensation factors motivate officers to act selflessly or selfishly when
it comes to corporate decision-making. It will look at how compensation schemes are
developed and whether the justification for their structure is justified. Finally the paper
will look at whether shareholders benefit at all from these activities proportionate to the
types of compensation an officer might receive for engaging in this kind of activity.

Relevance
As a JD/MBA student, I am often propelled into multi-disciplinary lenses that
meld theories to better understand a situation. During my degree, I had the benefit of
acting as the Managing Director of the Odette Business School’s Student Investment
Fund, where I contributed to the development of the fund’s by-laws and constating
documents. I witnessed, first hand, how the trustees and other administrative stakeholders
worked diligently to construct a fund that would serve the altruistic objectives of the
student body and donor, while still strongly including objectives that they felt needed to
3

be represented in an initiative of this nature. This could also be seen on the student side,
where Fund Managers and Analysts alike would attempt to assertively push investments
that they felt strongly about, even if it did not align with the spirit of the fund’s
investment policy. This led to further clarifications with respect to investment and
monitoring criteria such as a ban on all ‘Sin Stocks’ including tobacco and marijuana
companies. The effect of these restrictions are further exacerbated by the relationship
between the real professional world of finance and investing and academia, particularly
when many millions of dollars have been poured into marijuana stocks on speculation,
and is seen as a completely rational and encouraged behavior as of late. It also forced us
to forgo higher returns in ‘exciting’ investments because they were too risky based on the
Fund’s goals. It is clear then that there was two baskets of interests, one personal, and one
professional, that each of us needed to delineate between, in order to do our jobs and act
in the best interest of the fund.
Furthermore, there is a legal side to decision-making that stems beyond personal
interests and objectives. Fiduciary duty is an important pillar of business law. The
executive officers then, must be scrutinized to make sure they are in line with their duty.
This results in asking the question of whether buyers are paying a fair price for their
purchases when the selling entity is not directly benefitting. A closer look at the financing
side of these deals will shed light on the nature of the relationship posed above. If
executive officer’s are compensated in a way that forces them essentially to take on more
active M&A activity despite the real returns to shareholders, then there is a legal
conundrum of conflicting interests and decisions that are not being made within the scope
of their legal duties.
4

To that end, this paper sheds light on a few conclusions that are not readily
intuitive to directors & officers with respect to this relationship. It combines knowledge
from various disciplines and offers a unique perspective on how all these topics interplay
to create several statements about how power people behave.

5

CHAPTER 2
METHODOLOGY

The main method used for this paper is meta-analysis. I conducted a literature
review of articles related to the relationship of executive compensation on M&A activity
and aggregated them in a way that would allow me to derive several broad principles.
This added effect contributes to the body of knowledge where one specific study could
not. This literature review was done traditionally using various research strings in major
databases such as Google Scholar, ABI Inform and Proquest, leading databases on
management research journals. Additionally, I followed up with certain citations within
the articles to pursue any publications that provided a deeper discussion on the topic.
For the legal component, I used materials from various business law courses,
including Business Associations and Corporate Finance where a large portion of the
course is devoted to obligations of directors & officers and their legal duties.
Lastly, I used my experiences as a managing director of the John Simpson Odette
Student Investment Fund for two years during my degree, where I had to manage the
directives and interests of a board of trustee’s along with a team of Fund Managers and
Analysts who run the fund on a day-to-day basis and are primarily responsible for the
investment decisions of the fund.

6

CHAPTER 3
LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction to Mergers and Acquisitions
In order to understand the basic motivation for why executives conduct mergers
or acquisitions during their tenure, we must briefly outline what these business
transactions are for. In addition to growing the company from the inside, i.e. develop the
company’s current service or product to increase growth, companies can engage in M&A
in order to expedite growth at a much faster rate (e.g. Cooper, Gulen and Schill, 2008). A
Merger is when two companies combine under one entity, whereas an acquisition is when
a company buys another outright. For the purpose of this paper we will not address asset
purchases, although this is another way to expedite growth.
Companies engage in this kind of activity for a number of reasons. For starters,
M&A is the fastest way to acquire market share and remove competition. Then due to
more simplistic reasons like economies of scale and scope, companies can use that
increase in capital and production capacity to lower their overhead costs and either create
a higher profit margin or offer products at more competitive pricing, increasing their
overall sales. This is seen very heavily in the Swiss watch industry where companies
began acquiring suppliers of movement parts to control the quality of their product and
bring down costs.
Given the time sensitive demands of companies on their directors and officers to
produce results during their tenure, it is no surprise then that this avenue seems highly
attractive. Companies over time began linking compensation pay to number of
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acquisitions or ‘deal-flow’ so that an incentive was created for CEO’s to grow companies
faster and provide better returns for shareholders. The remaining question then is to what
extent is this positive reinforcement scheme actually creating quality deals versus simply
increasing the quantity of deal-flow? Further, is there a statistically proven rate of return
to shareholders in the long run versus creating inflated, but illusory, gains based on
speculation. If the case is the latter, then we have a scenario where the Board of Directors
is creating a compensation scheme that reinforces the issues inherent in basic agency
theory.

The Regulatory and Legal Landscape
As explained above, agency theory seeks to understand how directors & officers are
motivated towards decision-making, having considered their interests versus the interests of the
shareholders and company itself. If their motivations are not in line, it can create decision-making
processes that mark a strong divide between what is best for them and what is best for the
company. Ultimately you want to incentivize the decision-makers to make choices that best
reflect the needs of the company.

The legal landscape that speaks to this concept is fairly trite law in Canada and
undisputed. However, instead of having an eye towards positive reinforcement, the law
simply prescribes a fiduciary obligation on the officers to act in the best interest of the
company. It is a negatively reinforced obligation. Therefore, if one could prove that the
acquisition was done only in order to secure a stock option bonus for example, but would
negatively affect the acquiring company, the director could be found liable for breach of
obligations to the corporation.
8

In Canada, all directors and officers have two basic duties towards the
corporation; Fiduciary duty, and Duty of Care. Pursuant to the Ontario Business
Corporations Act, section 134(1):

“Every director and officer of a corporation in exercising his or her powers and
discharging his or her duties to the corporation shall,
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the
corporation; and
(b) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person
would exercise in comparable circumstances”

The Canadian Business Corporations Act has similar language. What does this mean
practically speaking? According to Peoples Department Stores v Wise, it means that
D&O must act honestly and in good faith specifically towards the corporation, i.e., the
entity itself. This is slightly different than the American purview of acting towards
increasing shareholder value purely. It includes obligations such as avoiding conflicts of
interests, maintaining confidentiality of information, serving the corporation selflessly,
honestly, and loyally, but most importantly not abusing their positions for personal
benefit.
BCE Inc. v 1976 Debentureholders reinforced this notion by explaining that the
duty owed is specifically to the corporation and generally focused on long-term interests.
Additionally, boards should turn their minds to different stakeholder groups but
9

ultimately be granted deference by way of the “business judgment rule” an admission by
the courts that perhaps the officers know how to run their company better than a judge.
Additionally under 134(1)(b), there is a Duty of Care whereby the courts will look
to see if the decision maker was reasonable and not necessarily perfect. The court does
not have the right to substitute its own opinion of what the decision should have been. Put
another way, as analogous to Administrative law, the test is that of reasonableness and
not correctness.
Having considered all the legal obligations above, we can begin to imagine how
basic motivation principles such as pay for performance can impact decision-making to
the point of creating a conflict of interest, or enticing directors and officers to act in their
best interest over the legal obligation of acting towards the interests of the corporation,
having considered the corporation’s stakeholders.

Socio-Psychological Frameworks that Drive Agency Issues
On one hand, M&A can provide quick and drastically high returns for companies
that the executives work for. On the other, they are mandated by law to only take risks
related to high-return M&A when it is in the best interest of the corporation. Therefore,
the corporation creates incentives to drive up acquisitions in the hopes that those
incentives don’t cause that behavior regardless of its positive or negative outcome. Yet
executives are also at least in part self-interested. This leads us to issues of agency theory
as well as the behavioural psychology aspect of incentivization with competing interests.
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One study by Jeongil Seo set out to ask the question: “Under what conditions will
the compensation package trigger CEO self-serving behaviours?” The study combines
equity theory and agency theory in the following way: equity theory seeks to course
correct one’s behavior using an analysis of their input over their output as compared to
others in similar positions. Then, if they feel as though they are working too hard for
what they get, or working too little for what they get, as compared to others, they will
course correct their behavior. This is done by either working less so it corresponds to
your compensation, working more if you feel your not doing enough for your
compensation, or seeking another opportunity where the input and output are on par with
your peers and outcome expectations. In the context of this study with respect to M&A
activity, the author wants to determine if CEO’s who feel they are underpaid want to
offset this discrepancy through more aggressive M&A and correspondingly more direct
say in the Board’s decision making process or conversely whether they are more likely to
leave the firm altogether, which is done by spending more time on their social equity to
increase their employability. The author found that when externally paid CEO’s were
underpaid, they attempted to restore that pay discrepancy by influencing their board’s
compensation decision process, which resulted in pay increases. This same demographic
also tended to engage in more acquisitions in an effort to increase firm size. Internally
paid CEO’s were more likely to engage in acquisitions and diversification activities.
Internally paid CEO’s expect increases in pay relative to firm size. They did not, in
contrast, try to interfere with board activities. This is explained by the other as behaviours
that are dictated by the CEO’s relationship to their peers. Internally paid CEO’s want to
maintain equity between themselves and their top managers and have more of a
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relationship based decision making structure, versus externally paid CEO’s who can act
in a more self-interested manner as the factors driving equity theory are low due to the
lower relational proximity to the rest of management as comparators. The CEO, if paid
internally will want to avoid lowering motivation of their internal managers fearing a
reduction in performance output. The study exemplifies the power of external
impressions driving one’s behavior and how perceived equity can dictate how deserving
one is for increased compensation forcing them to take on more activities like
acquisitions that can quickly fill the perceived inequity gap. This is essential to
disproving the idea that M&A activity is not only driven by personal profit maximization.
The fact of the matter is, executive pay has been increasing faster than firm
profitability (Rundell, 1995). One could reasonably conclude then that basic pay for
performance behavioral paradigms don’t work all that well. When we see executives take
on more aggressive stances towards acquisitions then, it begs the question of whether the
CEO is taking on that risk for themselves or predominantly for shareholder wealth
maximization.

Effects of Executive Compensation on Mergers and Acquisitions
As noted earlier, Mergers & Acquisitions – or Amalgamations, as is their legal
reference in Canada – are primary growth strategies when time is of the greatest concern.
They are the fastest way to gain market share, vertical integration capabilities, and most
importantly a quick way to acquire shareholder value. In order to create and foster an
environment conducive to acquisition, the board has to incentivize management to take
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on these risky business decisions. The primary way this is done is through their executive
compensation. A 1997 article entitled, Mergers and Acquisitions: How Executive
Compensation May affect a Deal is a fitting introduction into how the two intertwine.
The author notes why companies merge or acquire to begin with. First and foremost,
competitive pressure causes companies to seek quick solutions through combining
resources. These pressures compel companies to consolidate costs and pool resources,
which will increase efficiency and profit. The author also notes reasons such as product
or geographic diversification.
Unfortunately due to various motivational theories such as agency theory, there is
a known paradox between the priorities of the executive decision makers and the
shareholders. This has a potentially drastic effect on the corporation. A thesis completed
at Cornell on CEO compensation and incentives concluded that executive compensation,
specifically their bonuses, was most correlated with their own power to influence the
board of directors. While this increase in bonuses did positively correlate with their effort
to create valuable amalgamations, there was no significant correlation between bonuses
and deal performance.
Put simply by Amal and Said (2003) in their dissertation entitled The Dynamic
Relation Between CEO’s Compensation and Earnings Management, “Incentives and
opportunities induce managers to manipulate earnings.” Their study examines how
earnings management simultaneously interacts with the level and structure of managers’
compensation. It is a fitting start to the discussion because they lay a groundwork of sorts
with respect to the notion that compensation mixes will affect performance. To that effect
they put forward several points. First, management earnings is attenuated by the total
13

compensation mix beyond their base salary, this includes bonuses and stock-based
compensation. Second they look at the structure as an attenuating factor, such as whether
the stock is given outright or through the use of options. Third, they look at whether the
compensation mix contributes to effects of income smoothing and lastly, they look at the
relationship overall. These distinctions seem intuitive at first but are necessary for those
wanting to understand basic motivation theory and are not informed about the various
levels of compensation mix. They also are the premises that allow further studies to work
off of such as how M&A activity might differ given a change in any of these foundational
premises. The results of their study showed strong evidence that CEO’s have incentives
to manage earnings thus increasing their total compensation and maximizing their pay for
performance compensation categories such as bonuses and stock-options. Therefore,
before any M&A activity is undertaken at all, executives are inclined to manipulate
corporate performance in the interest of receiving higher financial incentives. This is just
the beginning of how management decisions will be undertaken in the interest of personal
gain.
In 2008, a series of authors from the University of Houston collaborated on a
meta-analysis of these very relationships to summarize past literature on the topic
(Williams, Michael and Waller, 2008). Fittingly, they set out to review managerial
incentives, merger activity, performance, and the use of compensation to mitigate agency
problems. The first thing they found, rather intuitively, is that there is a strong
relationship between pay and performance, but more so when all forms of compensation
were included. This is intuitive because any ancillary forms of compensation including
‘non-equity’ based compensation, in addition to one’s base salary, and from a
14

behavioural perspective, is known to enhance performance. Where the study becomes
more informative is with respect to the behavior of executive officers with respect to
M&A Aggressiveness. The study notes a 2004 article that asserts that because of the
tremendous bargaining power of CEO’s, they could very well end up negotiating deals
that are better for their personal portfolios than for the shareholders. They note that
Target company CEOs end up with ten to sixteen times their premerger cash
compensation and find that a large amount of CEO’s who exit the firm remain
unemployed following the merger. These results seem to indicate that there is more
incentive to cash out with a high profile merger that does not guarantee job security or
employment, rather than avoid the opportunity to make a safer decision on behalf of the
corporation.
More recently, in 2013, Becher & Juergens broached the topic in a paper entitled,
Do Acquirer CEO Incentives Impact Mergers? They argue that the wealth of a CEO prior
to engaging in a merger will impact their risk tolerance and ultimately their willingness to
undertake a merger. They note that when the structure of the CEO compensation mix
includes more risky types of compensation such as options, the company they belong to
will “likely become an acquirer, pay higher premiums, and experience lower post-merger
performance”. This article had an interesting impact on how we view incentives. While
traditional models would dictate wealth tied to performance and therefore risk, as the
cause of risk avoidance behavior, it can actually do the opposite if the risk is linked to
option wealth. This is significant because, as they note, while CEOs cannot impact how
the deal will perform after the fact, they have a high degree of influence on completion
and performance during the deal.
15

This is in contrast to a study by Grinstein and Hribar in 2003 that looked at
behaviours of the acquiring firm managers and executives. They claim that managerial
power is a primary determinant of bonus compensation. They found that the bonuses
directly related to the size of the merger, the length of time needed to finish the deal and
the number of board meetings during the year of acquisition. Additionally, in support of
certain CEO duality concerns, they found that the power managers had over their board
were more significant than effort and skill, two variables that the authors claim are not
reliable factors to explain bonus variation amongst the executive samples.
Bliss and Rosen (2001) in the same study found that managers actually benefit
from mergers that are more likely to harm shareholders. While boards seemed to have
rewarded managers and executives based purely on growth, there was no enquiry as to
the source of the growth, and so despite other indicators such as declining share price, the
CEOs continued to be compensated on generic and ambiguous growth measures. The
positive lining of the article was that it confirmed the notion that managers are less likely
to engage in acquisitions where they are compensated with equity versus cash. It
reinforces the idea that forcing the executive to have a financial interest in their decision
can align their interests with shareholders. This may align interests not only by way of
personal investment but also with respect to risk aversion theory. The authors note that
CEOs who engage in a high level of M&A activity are not being aggressive but rather are
spreading their risk amongst many corporations through the use of equity-based
compensation post-merger. Despite their demeanor, it is still a largely personal-driven
decision making process, without consideration towards shareholders, unless that risk
translates to the corporation as well. Presumably it would. Perhaps this is one scenario in
16

opposition of agency theory issues towards a more integrative interpretation of aggressive
M&A activity.
An article in 2009 by Fung, Jo & Tsai, looked at the various explanations behind
the agency problems that lead to irrational market-driven acquisitions. They set out to
examine the different ways in which stock market valuation and managerial incentives
jointly affect M&A activity. They also looked at post-M&A performance to enhance their
study. They found that market valuation had a significant effect on acquisition decisions,
more so where executive compensation included less managerial equity ownership, more
stock options, and no long-term incentive plans. They note that these acquisitions are
likely to be financed using the firm’s stock along with a high premium and done when the
market valued the equity higher than usual. While the management compensation mix
represents a certain profile that engaged in this kind of activity, partaking in acquisitions
during peak valuations should not always translate automatically into a self-serving
determination. The same can also be said with respect to using the companies own stock
to finance acquisitions. What can be said is that when these are done without a long-term
orientation, and in conjunction with the particular compensation mix, they tend to lead to
a decrease in the corporations value. Under these circumstances then the authors give
several reasons for this behavior such as self-interest, managerial myopia,
overconfidence, misaligned incentives, empire-building motives and poor corporate
governance. The article quotes quite an apt description of the views of the executive on
M&A activity. They cite an example from The New York Times, commenting on a
famous Merger of AOL and Time Warner in 2000, which became famous for destroying
firm value:
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“To most investors, mergers are the stock market’s equivalent of catnip…and yet,
for all the profit and promise that mergers seem to hold, the truth about companies
combining their operations is a darker one. Academic research suggests that few
mergers add up to significantly more prosperous or successful companies and also
that acquisitions during buyout booms, like the one we are in now, are more likely
to fail than those made in other periods. And when one company acquires another
using its own stock as currency, as commonly happens today, shareholders’ stakes
in the acquiring firm typically decline. What’s worse, there is a disturbing trend
among some of the most aggressive corporate acquirers to use deals to mask
deteriorating financial results at their companies and to reap outsize executive
pay.”

Other studies show that the cash compensation after a merger is a reflection of the
companies expected post-merger operating profit. This would support the more
calculated approach to a compensation committee decision making while simultaneously
aligning the interests to some post-merger metric of the target company.
Other times, a board of directors wants to encourage a normally conservative
CEO to engage in more risky behavior. Rosen (2005) notes that if the directors already
pay their executives well, they are more likely to make acquisitions in the future and that
these inflated compensation packages encourage merger activity in the first place. This
challenges the assumption that CEOs are presumed to have the more aggressive stance
towards this type of expatiated growth.
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Another paper that looked at M&A activity, specifically from a corporate
governance perspective saw tenure and risk play an interacting role. They note that
generally, corporations with high acquisition activity have younger CEOs with lower
tenure and are more agreeable to risk taking. This notion is consistent with other studies
finding CEOs with higher tenure to be more risk averse as a result of their comfortable
compensation scheme where they have more to lose if they take on uncertain activities.
The study also found that for the acquisitions that gave large returns, the boards for these
acquiring firms had a high degree of independence and operating efficiency. They also
have “higher managerial ownership and compensations of their CEOs have high bonus
incentives and low options incentives.” As well, they therefore have a higher fraction of
the cost of poor decisions. Unlike the other studies, this paper cites a strengthening of
corporate governance procedures post-acquisition, a silver lining in many of the
unsuccessful acquisition activity.
A study in 2015 by Bedwell et al., looked at CFO compensation during
Acquisitions years. They found that the CFO’s compensation was higher overall during
acquisition years as compared to all other CFO’s in the sample, where equity incentives
made up a larger portion of their compensation mix. The compensation increased as the
acquisition deal size increased and completion dates shortened. They also noted that CFO
compensation mix was not tied to short-term share prices.
A U.S. based study conducted between 1993-2006 found that CEO’s of firms with
at least one successful deal in a given year earned 5.1% (roughly $270,300) more than
CEOs in similar firms with no M&A activity. Further, “raising the annual deal value
relative to assets by 1$ increases the total CEO pay by about 23%” (Kumar, Kuo, &
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Ramchand, 2012). The article, in addition to their findings on the positive relationship
between M&A on compensation, note that the more entrenched the CEO, the less likely
to be effective at leveraging M&A success for increased compensation. They explain this
as a byproduct of more established CEO’s being driven by non-performance based
compensation. Given their tenure and influence they are more interested in maintain the
status quo than pursuing more risky performance initiatives. Lastly, and most
importantly, the article’s main conclusion is that CEO’s will try and leverage recent
strong firm stock activity to drive M&A activity, which in turn, positively impacts CEO
compensation. This is an interesting insight, as CEO’s may then put the corporations high
performance streak at risk by leveraging it for M&A activity whether truly justified or
not, in the interest of increasing their compensation. This is one very strong example of
the issue inherent in agency theory and executive compensation being influenced by
M&A.
Marsh et. Al., look at how CEO’s exercise their stock options after the acquisition
closes. They observed executives engaging in especially risky acquisitions with
increasing frequency, which in most cases have not created increases in shareholder
wealth and in some cases, decrease shareholder value. They also use agency theory and
overconfidence theory to look at how motivations change with respect to making an
acquisition decision as compared to following through once the decision is made. Put
simply, “Directors should be wary of overly optimistic CEO’s when making the decision
to acquire, however, they should be more wary of the firm being exploited for personal
gain once the decision to acquire has been made.” Thus the emphasis shifts from overly
confident CEO’s to concerns of agency theory and split interests once the acquisition has
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been set in motion. This is a particularly important insight with respect to how boards and
compensation committee’s craft their executive compensation schemes for acquisitions.
Broadly speaking, forms of Equity-Based Compensation (EBC) has shown to
provide more prudent investing by the officers and directors of a company. A study in the
Journal of Finance entitled “Executive Compensation and Corporate Acquisition
Decisions” by Datta, Iskander & Kartik Raman, show that as a result of equity based
compensation during the stock option compensation boom in the 1990’s they were able to
show that EBC could lower acquisition premiums and increase the acquisition of
companies with large growth opportunities. This study used long terms measures (-200
days/+3 years) to monitor the share price before and after acquisition announcements.
One of the reasons for this is to account for real value growth versus speculation
fluctuation during acquisitions. This is in stark contrast to a thesis by Andre Bickel,
which took advantage of abnormal returns during acquisitions announcements to measure
executive compensation levels. Over a period of nine years between 2006 and 2014,
Bickel measured cumulative abnormal returns on the day prior and day immediately after
acquisition announcements and found that negative abnormal returns were positively
correlated with bonuses and cash compensation, highlighting the issues of the agency
relationship.
Measuring impact around the acquisition announcement date may also have an
effect on perceived value of acquisitions by shareholders. Ruiz & Renneboog observed in
2013 whether CEO EBC’s influence acquiring shareholder value around the time of the
announcement. They found that shareholders generally value acquisitions more where the
EBC is higher. However, where a large shareholder has a higher percentage ownership in
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the company, they viewed the value lower if the EBC was higher. Further, they found
that excessive compensation negatively influences the acquiring shareholder valuation.
The authors emphasized the relationship between ownership and EBC to the extent it
impacts shareholder perception of value paid for executives and the perceived value of
the acquisitions themselves.
Not all compensation models are built to incentivize CEO’s equally. A
dissertation written by Bunyamin Onal at Georgia State University found evidence that
Boards will create customized incentive plans based on the type of acquisition, moving
from stock option to bonuses depending on the economic risk of the acquisition itself. He
notes that the, “greater economic uncertainties that are likely to follow conglomerate
acquisitions induce the board to rely more heavily on stock-based incentives, an external
monitoring system. This is a rather optimistic finding in that it presumes the board to not
only be conscience of compensation affects but actually use it to their advantage to
motivate CEO’s based on external conditions and market performance. This takes away
some of the decision-making power derived from incentivization schemes of the CEO’s
themselves. It also guarantees decisions that will at least try to secure future long term
performance. Thus even if motivated by compensation increase to drive acquisitions, it
would have a positive affect on corporate performance creating a win-win for both the
executive officers and the corporation.
This is an apt analysis given that the different types of compensation are
associated with different behaviors such as risk aversion. Depending on the
aggressiveness of the board, a company might be able to direct acquisition quantity,
irrespective of quality, depending on how they pay the CEO. A study by Gerard Sanders
22

looks at the behavioral responses of CEO’s depending on whether they are paid by way
of stock ownership versus stock options. He notes that most people mistake these two
compensation types as being aligned in terms of motivational incentive. However, he
claims that they are in actuality incongruent due to their “asymmetrical risk properties”.
CEO’s will then respond to these offerings in different ways. He concludes that these two
compensation schemes had “diametrically opposite effects on firms’ acquisition and
divestiture propensity” and that “situational characteristics moderated the risk-seeking
behavior associated with stock option pay but not risk aversion associated with
ownership”. Ultimately, these findings confirm that upper management is not immune to
these personal financial incentives increasing overall risk of decision making as it effects
corporate and shareholder interest.
Another study that looks at customizing compensation based on performance
seeks to understand how CEO compensation is protected against expenses postacquisition. Entitled, The Shielding of CEO Cash Compensation From Post-acquisition
Earnings’ Charges, the study looks at whether CEO compensation is protected against
negative effects of restructuring costs and asset impairments following the acquisition of
the controlling interest in the stock or another corporation. The study suggests that the
compensation committee places more weight on restructuring following an acquisition
than on earnings when determining CEO cash compensation. They will increase CEO
compensation to promote restructuring activities. CEO’s even reported compensation
increases even when the acquisition company reported a loss in its post-acquisition
performance. This direction towards restructuring promotion has been supported by other
studies as well. In a Dissertation at Pennsylvania State University, Anahit Mkrtchyan
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notes that there is some evidence to suggest that firms with higher equity-based
compensation experience better post-acquisition operating performance. Without
asserting a causation relationship, there is some correlation with respect to the emphasis
on restructuring and operating performance, despite potential short term losses.
Additionally, the article finds that CEO compensation is not negatively effected
when the company experiences goodwill impairments as a result of the acquisition, and is
completely shielded from negative effect if the acquiring company overpays for the target
firm. The author interprets these findings to mean that, “compensation committees place
greater emphasis on obtaining future synergistic gains from merger transactions despite
current year losses. While this study looks only at cash-based compensation, it allocates a
fair bit of agency on the Board of directors to use compensation to address their
organizational objectives. This study supports the notion that the board, along with the
compensation committee, is a lot more in control of the incentive structure based on the
needs of the acquisition, versus the implication that CEO’s can manipulate their
compensations structure to serve their needs through acquisition quantity. This notion is
not a new one. It has been a longstanding topic of interest for many finance academics. A
study done in 1990 looked at post-acquisition financial performance and executive
compensation also with respect to cash based compensation. While the results are similar,
they noted that the increase relative to the acquisition in most cases of their sample,
roughly corresponded to the added responsibilities of the executive management, thus
justifying the increase.
Up until this point, we have discussed scenarios where the board of directors
influences CEO compensation to drive acquisitions which could either positively or
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negatively affect the long term value of the corporation. However, there are instances
where the CEO themselves also hold a position on the board of directors. This causes an
even more suspicious scenario of how CEO and executive compensation is created. This
is known as CEO duality. CEO duality refers to a situation where the CEO also holds the
position of the chairman of the board. However, since the board of directors is set up to
monitor, hire and fire executive management and create their compensation schemes, a
conflict of interest could arise depending on the amount of control that CEO has on the
rest of the board. Its initially conceived purpose was altruistic. The corporation could
create better value if the executive team was unified with the ideals, values and direction
of the board. However, this control comes with the potential for shareholders to have a
difficult time of disciplining or removing the CEO.
One particular study set out to find out if this CEO duality affects compensation
with respect to M&A activity. The article by Dorata and Petra (2008) sought to examine
whether CEO duality further exacerbates CEO’s motivation of self-interest to engage in
mergers and acquisitions to increase their compensation. In their findings they discover
that for merging firms CEO compensation is positively associated with firm size, but the
association is not moderated by CEO duality. Conversely for non-merging firms, CEO
compensation is positively associated with firm size and firm performance. In fact, it was
a moderator between firm size and performance. In other words, CEO duality has an
effect on their compensation increase, which is not driven as much by performance based
standards. This is in contrast to the high-risk M&A-activity firms where CEO’s are
rewarded for their high-risk behavior. The study recommends that shareholders should
support the separation of Board chair and CEO in order to keep compensation levels
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positively associated with firm performance. Despite similar governance structure and
firm performance, CEO’s of merging firms command higher compensation.
In addition to the relationship between the variables as they pertain to M&A
activity more generally, there were those who sought to leverage particularly difficult
economic times to see if this relationship might be affected. The most opportune event
recently to conduct such a study was with respect to the 2008 financial crisis, where
corporate activity had a direct link to individual greed and behavioural theories. Clinton
Robert Satyavelu, at the University of Phoenix, wanted to see if the relationship between
compensation and corporate performance would change in the context of economic
hardship during the 2008 government bailout. The study looked at annual compensation
and end-of-fiscal-year financial share price of Fortune 500 financial industry stock
performance over a five year period leading up to the bailout. Interestingly, the study
revealed a non-significant relationship between executive compensation and share price.
However, the author did recommend a qualitative assessment that compensation
committee’s can use to benchmark comparative companies against theirs to determine the
best mix of executive compensation. The author further claims that this benchmarking
system would provide a strong defense against government and shareholder activist
initiatives to enforce compensation restrictions. There is a rather pronounced convenience
to showing no relationship right after the crisis, when we have other studies that highlight
the sophistication of directors and compensation committee’s to direct the type of
compensation mix to a desired goal.
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CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION

When viewed altogether, the studies show several interesting insights into the
world of behavioural modification related to corporate decision making. They begin by
outlining some of the complexities that arise out of choosing the right type of
compensation. This is seen for example where the difference of a bonus or an option in
the acquiring firm can change the CEO’s risk profile because he may then have ‘skin in
the game’. They continue by discussing the measures of firm performance and how that
may or may not accurately reflect what they are trying to accomplish, or even accurately
reflect the actual performance of the firm because they account for abnormal returns.
Traditionally, one would think that generally there is a positive correlation between pay
and performance. All of these insights led however, led to a more complex picture.

The first insight to be addressed is the very opposite of the traditional view; Pay
for performance can negatively impact director & officer decisions to engage in M&A.
While it seems counterintuitive, this is the findings of many studies that reinforce and
give life to agency theory issues. For example, CEO’s with higher tenure and more
established compensation structures were reluctant to take on a more risky decision style.
The more they got paid and the longer they were there, the more it seemed they wanted to
maintain the status quo. Another study showed this by proving that CEO’s are largely
self-interested. When paid for M&A Activity, they will be more inclined to push deals
through while the long term performance, or post-merger performance, suffers. This was
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even more prevalent in cases of CEO duality where they have more influence as they
reside in both executive management and the board of directors.

The second insight is that executive officers are not only guided by compensation
maximization. Studies show this, as explained above, with older more established CEO’s
who don’t seek to maximize pay for performance options where they are already getting
compensated well for their tenure. One could argue that the risk averse strategy, in their
mind, is maximizing profit, as the pay for performance is too high of a risk, but the
research pointed to risk avoidance and comfort as the prime reasons for this preference.

The third insight I noticed was that there is a difference between tying
compensation to perceived shareholder satisfaction and actual value creation for the
corporation. This insight was one of the more interesting ones this paper has come
across. One of the most used measures of corporate return was shareholder value. What
surfaced very quickly was a notion that this is not such a clear-cut exercise. Even if the
study ignored institutional trading and accredited investor activity, there is a looming
question of when a researcher ought to measure the market capitalization value in relation
to the acquisition itself. One study found that they were able to capture abnormal returns
by measuring the day before and the day after the announcement date of the acquisition.
If we parallel this to studies about CEO’s making acquisitions for short term gains in
order to get a pay day, the abnormal returns should be high, in addition to taking
advantage of certain peak market times. However these abnormal times are largely
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illusory and thus, while they can inform us about the dangers of agency theory, do not
actually give a fair indicator as to how the company is performing as a real result of the
activity. One study combatted this by measuring performance of certain measure like
book to market ratio and market capitalization over various intervals such as 60 days 200
days and year to date. This gave a more accurate picture of the firm performance, but it,
like others, showed a decline in firm performance in the long term, post-merger or
acquisition.

The fourth insight is that the board of directors and the compensation committees
are actually significantly more sophisticated with respect to crafting schemes that target
specific behaviours. This has deep ramifications for issues of agency theory. This is
because the intent of the executive officers don’t matter as much if their interests, no
matter how selfish, are not only in line with the company, but actually provoked
intentionally by the committee and directors that pay them. Agency theory becomes an
issue when CEO’s are acting in their self-interest and it conflicts with that of the
corporation. However, if the corporation is eliciting those behaviours by trying to create a
compensation scheme that targets more risk taking, it would be hard to blame the CEO’s
for this activity. This was especially true with boards hiring younger CEO’s because they
had a more risky attitude towards M&A. Compensation committees became even more
savvy when they began giving CEO’s option based pay instead of bonuses intentionally
to keep CEO’s invested in their decisions. This is highly sophisticated, as the traditional
view of agency theory presumes misaligned objectives due to traditional compensation
schemes.
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The fifth insight is that directors and officers will not only make financial
decisions that actually impact a company based on their compensation, but will also
engage in management practices such as earnings management to fictitiously inflate
company health when faced with potentially higher compensation as a result. This insight
seems surprising at first, but then seems fitting given the other articles about post-merger
performance and measuring abnormal returns. Along with inflated market prices, and
managerial influence to push a deal through, some executives have resorted to earnings
management in order to achieve financially appealing statistics that favour M&A activity.
This is perhaps another jarring tool in their tool belt to romanticize M&A decisions. This
insight becomes particularly concerning in situations of CEO duality when they have
even more control over the board as well as the executive and exert influence to advance
these changes.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

As noted above, the world of M&A activity and executive compensation is a very
complex one. CEO’s are motivated by any number of things depending on their personal
characteristics, and these entities are so sophisticated that it makes one wonder whether
CEO’s can be blamed at all for their behaviours if directors are so willing and able to
manipulate them through the use of compensation. Moreover, agency theory would
suggest that there are issues derived from misaligned goals, but if the goals are aligned
due to this compensation rigging, then they can align goals even if the underlying motive
of management is selfish. After all corporations don’t need altruistic management, just
one’s that are objectively aligned. The ends justify the means. I am not insinuating that
executives are unsophisticated puppets that act only according to their boards, they too
need to have an understanding of how they react to certain incentive schemes so they can
combat their inclinations to make shortsighted decisions. Moreover, a note can be taken
again from the Swiss watch industry. In the past ten years or so, export sales of Swiss
watches have been highly depressed. This is due to a number of reasons such as the Swiss
franc inflation and a post-recession frugalness. To combat these reduction in sales, Swiss
watch companies began selling numerous “Limited Edition” models every year. The
variety and amount of SKU’s skyrocketed created interesting and rare one-off’s that
collectors would purchase at a premium. While the consumer base shrunk, the watch
companies began squeezing any novelty they could for an immediate dollar, even if it
hurt the firm’s market value in the long run. They sacrificed long term value with
immediate revenue. This is an apt parallel to the world of acquisitions. At the very
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beginning of the paper, it was noted that acquisitions and mergers are the fastest way to
grow in a market as compared to internal growth and has some immediate rewards. It is
possible then, that just to stay afloat, companies are banking on high valuation cycles and
quick gains to survive in the short term at the expense of long-term valuations. If this is
the case, fault cannot be attributed to any one executive. The liability may fall on them all
equally.
Looking back at the broader theme of corporate governance, we have to ask
whose obligation is it anyway? If the directors and officers are so sophisticated, then
despite their intelligent processes, could they be held liable for breaching their fiduciary
duty if they knowingly egg on an executive’s selfish streak in the hopes that the
aggressive acquisition behavior benefits them in some way? Agency theory issues, in
some ways, stemmed from a place of ignorance. Surely if directors knew that
management was misaligned with them they would take efforts to correct it. Conversely,
where the directors consciously affect behaviours, this would have drastic impacts on
their duty of care and fiduciary obligation. Ultimately, all of these disciplines combine
and interact with each other. The gamut of corporate governance grows wider each day,
with more sophisticated players, which have a responsibility to understand the finer
complexities of corporate action.
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CHAPTER 6
LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Amongst the many articles, studies and papers discussed in this paper, there are a
few key themes that are common. The first is that this subject understandably became
very popular after the 2008 financial crisis resulting in many studies around this time
period. More research would likely uncover other notable dates that the publications
revolve around. There is a very enticing relationship to explore when an entire country is
blaming a specific group for self-serving behaviours related to financial gain. In fact, it
was originally my intention to look at a period of data between 2010 and 2014
specifically for this reason, to see how this organizational behavior changed or remained
the same in the period following the crisis. It is easy to find self serving relationships
amidst the activity of the financial crisis. More research is needed to smooth out the
results over years and decades to make more sound conclusions. It might even benefit us
to find some qualitative moderating factor over those decades that can account for
economic cycles in both society and business. The second key theme is that many of
these papers are working papers. I need not delve into the concerns related to a lack of
peer review processes. Although despite that I think they have contributed to the
summary of knowledge by exploring novel relationships and new ways of attacking a
common problem, i.e. the paradox of conflicting motives.
Having briefly discussed certain observations that may limit the research, there
are ample new topics to be researched and studied up on. In my review, there were three
main areas of research I wanted to examine in more depth.
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The first is the relationship of geography and cross-cultural management with
respect to executive compensation and M&A activity. This is, in my mind, the most
important area for further enquiry in the literature. We are fortunate to now have financial
exchanges in some of the most diverse areas and cultures around the globe. With each
culture comes a unique cultural dimension – relating to traditional theories of Hofstede
and Trompenaar – and with each cultural dimension comes a new way of thinking about
how human beings are motivated, their philosophy of work, and how they make decisions
in the interest of the corporation they work for. Even a simple concept such as low power
distance and uncertainty avoidance can have drastic effects on how executives make
acquisition decisions.
The second area of study is that of industry differences amongst M&A activity.
Research is readily available with respect to the frequency of acquisitions in each
industry. Some industries, such as real estate have a much higher rate of acquisitions than
others such as consumer staples. This is due, in part, to the unique characteristics of each
market. For example, technology has a rather large growth rate and as a result they go
through much shorter business cycles than energy for example. This creates many more
opportunities for acquisitions with new companies and products surfacing every month.
In Figure 1 below, we can see a basic distribution of acquisition activity of Russell 3000
companies between 2010 and 2014.
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Figure 1

Table 1

INDUSTRY
0-1
1-2
2-3
3-4
4-5
5-6
6-7
7-8
8-9
9 and Over

Consumer Discretionary
Consumer Staples
Energy
Financials
Health Care
Industrials
Information Technology
Materials
Real Estate
Telecommunication Services & Utilities
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There is quite a lot to be discovered if the studies focused on the differences of
acquisition activity based on industry. Aside from looking at how the industries operate,
it can help inform us about the behavioral conditioning of CEOs who come from
particular industries. Directors could better design the compensation mix to offset any
behavioural habits the industry worked into the CEO’s mindset. Directors could also
focus on poaching executives that come from an industry that has a more desirable
mindset towards the particular objectives of the corporation.
Lastly, there is an area of research that can be done with respect to the CEOs
themselves, regardless of the intentions, objectives and behaviours of the directors to
achieve certain organizational goals. There is ample information now on Bloomberg that
can report on CEO tenure, age, work history, and frequency of acquisitions during tenure.
These statistics can greatly contribute to the knowledge base about the habits of CEOs.
As noted above in the literature, there is something to be said about how longer tenured
CEOs prefer to avoid risk so as to maintain there current lifestyle. This is in contrast to
younger CEOs who have more to prove with less on the line, who are more willing to
take on more aggressive growth strategies. Compensation committees and boards can use
this information to target specific behaviours. This will greatly reduce issues in agency
theory as you are pulling individuals who, while their dispositions are largely selfish, will
align nicely with the organizational goals. The alternative is a mismatch of goals that
leads to agency issues.
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